By Muhammad Ali Shahab
Abstract
This article compares the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) of Pakistan and the UK’s Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) in delivering administrative justice alongside traditional courts. It examines their accessibility, procedural flexibility, enforcement powers, and independence, drawing on statutory provisions, operational data, and case studies. Findings show that both provide free, swift and less formal alternatives to litigation, with the FTO enjoying quasi-judicial powers, high compliance rates, and Suo moto authority, while the PHSO relies on parliamentary oversight and systemic reforms recommendations. Courts remain essential for binding legal rulings, but ombudsmen resolve routine grievances more efficiently and at lower costs, easing judicial burdens. The study concludes that enhancing public awareness, expanding jurisdiction, and strengthening enforcement, drawing on UK experience, could further the FTO’s capacity to fulfil Pakistan’s constitutional mandate for “inexpensive and expeditious justice”.
Introduction
The concept of administrative justice in modern democracies encompasses both formal adjudication by courts and alternative review mechanism such as ombudsmen. In Pakistan, Article 37(d) of the 1973 Constitution imposes a duty on the state to ensure “inexpensive and expeditious justice” for all. Court of law, from magistrates’ courts up to the Supreme Court, remain the primary forums for enforcing legal rights, but they can be slow, technical and costly. To address maladministration without resort to the courts, Pakistan and the UK have each established ombudsman institutions with broad investigative powers.
In Pakistan, the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO), created by Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance 2000, handles complaints by taxpayers against officials of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), including income tax, Sales tax, Customs and excise departments. In the United Kingdom the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) investigates complaints from members of the parliament about maladministration by UK government departments, agencies and the NHS in England. Both offices are statutory bodies designed to give layperson an accessible forum for grievances against the state, unlike courts, they use informal procedures and focus on fair outcomes rather than strict legal rights.
Accessibility and Procedural Flexibility
The Federal Tax Ombudsman offices are in major cities, such as Lahore, Karachi, and the head office in Islamabad, providing a venue to complain against tax officials in the FBR. The FTO is empowered by its enabling statute to “diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice” done to a taxpayer by maladministration of the FBR. In practice, this means a taxpayer can file a complaint in writing, via WhatsApp or online portals without paying any fee. There is an emphasis on conciliation: the FTO “informally conciliates and amicably resolves” disputes whenever possible. Hearings before the Ombudsman or relevant advisors are private and do not follow the strict rules of evidence and procedure that govern courts. In Contrast, tax disputes in the courts (for example in Tax Appellate Tribunals or High Courts) involve formal pleadings, fixed deadlines, court fees, need for lawyers and long hearing dates. The FTO therefore offers no cost and greater ease of access: by law no lawyer is needed, no court fee is charged, and complaints often get a hearing within few weeks.
Similarly in the UK, the PHSO’s service is “completely free, focused on fairness and open to everyone”. Complainants need not to pay to bring a case to the ombudsmen, whereas judicial remedies (for example, judicial review against a government decision) can involve significant legal costs and court fees. However, it is important to note that non-NHS complainants, health service complaints can be sent directly, must first pursue their grievance with the relevant department and then request an MP to make a complaint on their behalf. Thus the UK system has a gatekeeping “MP filter” for most cases, which is an extra step, not required in Pakistan for FTO cases. In Summary, both ombudsman schemes greatly reduce the cost and procedural barriers of formal litigation: they impose no filing fees, allow self-representation and use flexible procedures.
Legal Authority and Enforcement Powers
In terms of formal authority, however, courts and ombudsman differ sharply. Courts can issue binding judgements enforceable by law, whereas an ombudsman’s conclusion are generally recommendations. The FTO is given a strong authority by the statute, “has the same powers as a civil court” for summoning witnesses, requiring documents and hearing testimony. The FTO can also award compensations to an aggrieved taxpayer and can even punish for contempt, much like a supreme court, in case of non-compliance. Moreover, the FTO’s findings must be implemented by the FBR: within 30 to 45 days, it must “inform the FTO about the action taken,” and failure to comply without satisfactory reasons is treated as a “defiance of recommendations,” inviting disciplinary action or contempt proceedings. In Practice, this means well over 90% of FTO recommendations are accepted by the FBR. For Example, in 2023 about 8,963 complaints were handled by the FTO and 7,880 resolved, and “over 93.50% of the recommendations of the FTO office had been accepted by the FBR” that year. This high compliance rate highlights that despite being technically a recommendation, an FTO award functions almost like a binding order against tax officials.Appeals from an FTO decision are extremely limited, only the president of Pakistan can hear an appeal on legal points, which underscores the FTO’s quasi-judicial finality. While under section 29 of the FTO ordinance 2000, any court or other authority can question the validity of any action/order, nor can they grant any injunction. In effect, for the average taxpayer an FTO decision on maladministration is a practical alternative to a court verdict.
By Contrast, the UK Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman cannot enforce its recommendation by direct order. Its power derives from the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (as amended). The PHSO can investigate complaints of “maladministration” (broadly defined as unfairness, poor service or unfair decision-making) and make recommendations including apologies, financial redress or changes to procedures. When a complaint is upheld the PHSO issues a report and recommendations to the public body. While its findings must be laid before Parliament and cannot be overturned by Ministers, the Ombudsman lacks direct coercive power. Government departments generally cooperate (and a parliamentary committee has observed that of hundreds of recommended payments only one was found unpaid in a three-year period), but in theory a minister could refuse to implement a recommendation. The 1967 Act allows the ombudsman to publish special reports if departments ignore the finding, but ultimately enforcement is by publicity and parliamentary oversight rather than court enforcement. Judicial review of an Ombudsman’s decision is possible but limited: courts ten to defer, treating the Ombudsman as a distinct “office of Parliament” rather than a government department.
Responsiveness, Efficiency and Case Volume
On responsiveness and speed, data show ombudsmen generally outperform courts. In Pakistan tax courts are notoriously overburdened, appeals and writ petitions often take years, whereas the FTO disposes of cases in months. For example, under the current ombudsmen a record over 16,000 complaints were received in 2025, till Aug 2025. While in previous years, 6,043 complaints were disposed in 2022, up from 2868 in 2021, and 7,889 in 2023. These figures indicate strong year on year growth in throughput. This also indicates the increase of trust and awareness about the institution.
For perspective, the UK PHSO handled even larger volume, in 2023-24 it made 36,982 decisions on complaints (a record), including 8,835 full investigations. Its annual reports show rising demand (29,306 new complaints accepted in 2023-24, plus 7,580 represented cases). A graph of the PHSO’s caseload over time illustrates this growth: the office accepted roughly 31,000 complaints in 2019-20, dipped during the pandemic, then returned to 29,000-30,000 in recent years). The comparison of both institution using only number of cases/complaints would be unfair or misguiding as FTO only deals with maladministration of the FBR while the PHSO deals with all matters and complaints of governmental departments. What matters is that in both systems most cases are revolved relatively quickly. By comparison, litigating a tax or administrative matter in court might take years and cost far more. If a court case is filed and the FTO route is also pursued, the FTO must dismiss the complaint as “subjudice” if the matter is already before a court. This rule helps avoid duplication and reflects that FTO is meant to complement, not replace, the judicial system.
Institutional Independence and Impartiality
Institutional independence and impartiality are critical for both courts and ombudsmen. In Pakistan, the FTO is formally under the President, but in intended to act independently. The Ombudsman hold the status of a Supreme Court judge, and the office has its own secretariat and budget. Pakistan’s Supreme Court has on occasions upheld the broad jurisdiction of the FTO against bureaucratic challenge. By law the FTO must operate free of executive interference: its decisions are implemented by the FBR, but approval must be reported to the Ombudsman’s office and only a presidential review can override an FTO decision. This means the FTO enjoys a degree of autonomy comparable to the judiciary within the tax sphere.
In the UK, the PHSO is explicitly independent of government. It is appointed by the King on the joint addresses of Parliament and is answerable to Parliament (through the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee) rather than to any minister. Its statutory duty is to act “fairly,” and it publishes data and reports to Parliament on government failures. One UK analysis notes that while the Ombudsman cannot be overruled by ministers, parliamentary questions about the Ombudsman’s work must go to a Cabinet minister, ensuring civilian oversight. In practice, the PHSO also enjoys strong institutional independence backed by civil service protections, though critics like, Endicott sometimes argue it lacks teeth to compel change.
Effectiveness in Delivering Administrative Justice
Ombudsmen and courts each have strengths and limitations. Courts can adjudicate complex legal issues and set precedents but only the FTO has comparable quasi-judicial powers among ombudsmen in this comparison. The FTO’s ability to “redress” maladministration means it can order refunds or cancel assessments if they were unlawful or arbitrary. For example, in a recent case the FTO directed the FBR not to deduct tax on daily-wage employees below the taxable threshold, effectively granting relief that a court might also have provided. Courts, meanwhile, may be clogged with cases that could be handled informally. In Pakistan, thousands of tax appeals languish in the system: by contrast, the FTO helps clear the backlog by resolving many complaints without litigation.
In the UK, PHSO often highlights systemic failures (for example, it produced a landmark “Broken Trust” report on NHS failures) that courts rarely address. Its recommendations to improve procedures can benefit many citizens beyond the individual complainant. However, unlike a judge the Ombudsman cannot strike down a policy or award large damages beyond what is recommended (in 2023-24 PHSO recommended only £341,937 in payments total, a modest sum). Courts have lost no power over fundamental rights; only the courts can issue binding orders of law or interpret statutes definitively. Indeed, an individual who wants to challenge the legality of a government decisions (Rather than just seek fair treatment) must go to court. Ombudsmen do no replace judicial review in either county.
On responsiveness, the ombudsman model clearly offers advantages for ordinary citizens. Averages show that FTO cases are resolved in months; PHSO cases typically conclude within a year. The ombudsman’s informal style and emphasis on mediation also mean many cases are settled by apology or explanation rather than drawn-out conflict. This contrasts with courts, where strict procedure, appeals and adjournments can cause protracted delay. For the Public, the OMB route is simpler and less intimidating. A Pakistan taxpayer not versed in law can often get relief from the FTO without hiring a lawyer, whereas in court legal representation is nearly mandatory for complex tax litigation. Similarly, NHS patients in England may prefer complaining to the PHSO rather than mounting a judicial review against a health authority. Surveys from the UK show that complainants find the PHSO’s service easier to navigate than the courts, though some complain of the MP filter or the need to exhaust local remedies first.
Fire Fighting or Fire Preventing
Harlow and Rawlings, in their critical examination of the role of ombudsmen in the United Kingdom, posed a fundamental question regarding institutional focus: should ombudsmen primarily concentrate on handling individual complaints, engaging in reactive “firefighting”, or should they instead invest in identifying systemic patterns of maladministration and addressing root causes through proactive “fire-watching” and prevention? Harlow notably critiques the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) for lacking a clearly defined role in this regard, arguing that investigations consuming nearly eighty hours of departmental staff time per case risk rendering the institution inefficient if it functions merely as a substitute for a small claims court. Instead, he advocates for a more strategic function, whereby the PHSO employs its investigatory insights to promote structural reforms within public administration and pre-empt future complaints through preventive measures.
In contrast, the Federal Tax Ombudsman (FTO) of Pakistan has demonstrably aligned itself with the latter model. Section 9(1) of the FTO Ordinance, 2000 empowers the Ombudsman to act Suo motu, initiating investigations on its own motion rather than merely in response to individual grievances. In doing so, the FTO not only addresses isolated complaints but also undertakes the broader task of identifying patterns of systemic dysfunction within the Federal Board of Revenue. The office frequently issues recommendations aimed at curbing recurrent instances of maladministration, ranging from instructing public display of disciplinary outcomes to proposing procedural reforms and conducting guidance sessions with revenue officials. This emphasis on institutional learning and preventive action underscores the FTO’s role not merely as a grievance redressal body, but as an agent of administrative reform and accountability, better reflecting the proactive vision Harlow and Rawlings argued for.
Comparative Lessons and Reform Opportunities
Institutional analyses in both countries suggest that the two systems serve different but complementary roles. In Pakistan, even Supreme Court judges have remarked that relief should be available outside the traditional courts to fulfill article 37(d). The FTO’s success, evidenced by rising case intake and high compliance rates., indicates that many taxpayers trust it more than the courts for routine grievances. The main criticisms of the FTO tend to be about limited public awareness and ensuring consistent enforcement; some observers note that provincial tax systems have no equivalent ombudsman, creating uneven access.
In the UK, the PHSO is widely regarded as a cornerstone of accountability its investigations have prompted major public service reforms. A recent parliamentary briefing notes that governments accept almost all PHSO findings (over 99% compliance on financial recommendations). The PHSO’s independence from government and high visibility, reports are laid before Parliament, help ensure people’s complaints lead to action. However, some UK commentors, Endicott being the lead, argue that legislative reforms are needed to give the ombudsman more power, for example, to enforce standards across all public bodies. The UK experience shows that a well-resourced ombudsman can improve citizen trust in administration and reduce burdens on the courts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, for the ordinary citizen the ombudsman tends to serve justice more immediately and accessibly than the courts. Both the FTO in Pakistan and the PHSO in the UK deliver a form of administrative justice that is free, user-friendly and relatively swift. Courts, by contrast, are essential for resolving legal questions and securing binding declaration of rights, but they impose higher costs and complexity on litigants. Empirical trends suggest that citizens use ombudsman services far more frequently than courts for the types of disputes these offices handle (tens of thousands of cases each year). This supports the view that ombudsmen are effective at solving day-to-day injustices and providing “inexpensive and expeditious justice” in line with constitutional ideals. For Pakistan, the UK’s example underscores several lessons: ensure the FTO and other ombudsmen have sufficient independence and resources; expand outreach so citizens know these options exist and consider broadening ombudsman jurisdiction or enhancing its enforcement.
In sum, while courts remain the ultimate arbiters of law, ombudsmen appear to “Serve justice better” for the average citizen’s routine grievances, offering a complementary channel that is cheaper, faster and mor attuned to fairness. A robust ombudsman system can thus relieve pressure on courts and bring administration closer to the people, embodying the constitutional promise of accessible justice.
References/Bibliography
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